

Lessons-Learned:

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations



A GUIDE FOR UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PLANNERS

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**Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), U.S. Department of State
in coordination with the Joint Policy Council's Security and Regional Stability Working Group/Sub-Group
on DDR
and the U.S. Agency for International Development**

PREFACE

The mission of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize United States Government (USG) civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help reconstruct and stabilize societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy. A core function of S/CRS is to learn from experience—translate lessons from previous or ongoing USG reconstruction and stabilization interventions into improvements in future planning and operations.

S/CRS plans a series of “thematic guides” that summarize lessons-learned on a range of topics dealing with reconstruction and stabilization. These guides are meant to inform Washington and field-based planners. Grounded in USG experience, the guides are formatted as “how-to” manuals as part of a comprehensive USG civilian planning process. Thematic guides are reference tools on specific post-conflict topics and should be used in conjunction with other USG policy guidance and supplemental materials.

This Guide on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) does not address lessons-learned at the level of program implementation. It is an overview of strategic-level issues for interagency planners and is meant to complement a more thorough “step-by-step” guide to be published by the Department of State/U.S. Agency for International Development’s Joint Policy Council’s Security and Regional Stability Working Group’s/Sub-Group on DDR. This Guide is the result of discussions with the Joint Council, a week-long session with a group of government and non-government experts on DDR programs, and a roundtable session with a broader community of DDR experts held at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The primary objective of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration in reconstruction and stabilization operations is to increase the security of post-conflict environments by disarming and demobilizing armed elements and facilitating the return of ex-combatants to civilian life. DDR is a complex process that has cultural, political, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. DDR has the potential to provide incentives for commanders and combatants to come to the negotiating table, facilitate political reconciliation, dissolve belligerent force structures, and present opportunities for ex-combatants and other DDR beneficiaries to return to their communities. A successful DDR program can pave the way to sustainable peace. A failed DDR effort can stall security sector reform, disrupt peace processes, and socially and economically destabilize communities—leading to a renewal of conflict.

DDR is used to reduce the size of or eliminate belligerent armed forces and facilitate ex-combatants' return to sustainable civilian livelihoods. A DDR program typically moves from *demobilization and disarmament*, the act of releasing or disbanding an armed unit and the collection and control of weapons and weapon systems, to *reintegration*, facilitating ex-combatants return to civilian life through benefit packages and strategies that help ex-combatants become socially and economically embedded in their communities.

1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF DDR IN RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION PLANNING

DDR dictates, and is dictated by, a variety of priority areas in reconstruction and stabilization planning. The promise of DDR to formerly competing fighting forces often plays a central role in reaching a peace agreement. DDR planning is also directly tied to security sector reform, which determines the potential shape and size of future military, police and other security structures. In addition, reintegration of combatants back to their communities can lay the groundwork for and determine the success of longer-term peacebuilding and development programs.

DDR's success depends on an integration of strategies and planning across a wide range of sectoral areas. For example, if economic development does not progress sufficiently to provide long-term economic opportunities for communities in general, disarmed and demobilized ex-combatants may face unemployment once the immediate benefits of a DDR program expire. The probability of returning to violence (as a way to earn money) increases in this scenario. DDR programs only succeed coordinated with reform efforts in other key sectors including the security sector (reform of the military and police), rule of law, governance, and the economy.

1.2 OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE OF THE GUIDE

The following DDR Guide aims to provide USG personnel in Washington and in the field with a lessons-learned resource to assist in strategic-level planning for DDR. Detailed implementation plans are not included in the Guide. (For a complete, step-by-step methodology of DDR programming, please see the Joint Policy Council's forthcoming guide on DDR). Rather, the goal is to ensure that USG planners broadly consider, design and manage DDR programs based on lessons from past experience. S/CRS Thematic Guides should be used in conjunction with other USG policy guidance and supplemental materials.

Lessons learned are organized to follow a planning process that includes: 1) Undertaking a strategic assessment (Note: assessments can take place before or at any point in the planning cycle); 2) Determining the USG role and management structure; 3) Planning for strategic design and implementation of the DDR process; and 4) Monitoring and evaluating DDR programs.

2. THE USG PLANNER'S GUIDE FOR DDR

2.1 CONDUCTING A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

Planning for a successful DDR program requires an understanding of *both* the situation on the ground *and* the goals, political will and resources the USG and other international donors are willing to contribute to DDR efforts. Effective DDR planning relies on analysis of possible DDR beneficiaries, power dynamics, local society, and the nature of the conflict/peace process.

Assessment methodology must be carried out in close consultation with local national and USG/international personnel with an in-depth knowledge of the country. The USG may enter DDR processes at many different stages—strategic assessments may be necessary at a variety of points in the planning process to guide USG decision-making.

Strategic Assessment includes:

- *Assessing Country Context for Design of DDR Programming*
- *Assessing USG Political, Funding and Legal Context for DDR*

PLANNING PROCESS FOR LESSONS-LEARNED

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

- Situational analysis including the severity and causes of problem(s).
- Consideration of USG, key partners, and host country's national interests
 - Political and legal context for USG intervention.



DETERMINING USG ROLE AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

- Determining USG role in DDR efforts.
- Illustrative list of types of USG strategic, funding and operational support
 - Coordination with international donors and institutions.




PLANNING FOR STRATEGIC DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

- Develop program approach and budgeting for D, D, and R.
 - Establish monitoring and evaluation criteria.



MONITORING AND EVALUATION

- Measure outcomes and assess program impacts.
- Determine future needs and revise/refine as appropriate.



ASSESSING A COUNTRY CONTEXT FOR DESIGN OF DDR PROGRAMMING

The following chart gives some illustrative examples that demonstrate how an assessment process could inform DDR planning:

Illustrative Assessment Questions	Possible Implications for Planning
<p>Status and content of the peace process: Is the peace process ongoing? Has a peace accord been signed? Is there a ceasefire? Are hostilities ongoing? What degree of detail related to DDR has been specified in the accord/ceasefire agreement?</p>	<p>The design of DDR programs is often dictated as part of a peace process. When possible, the planning team should address DDR planning in the peace accord, particularly DDR's link to security sector reform measures, economic development and other key aspects of reconstruction and stabilization. Peace processes should provide amnesty conditions, if any, as they relate to ex-combatants.</p>
<p>Nature of the conflict: What are the underlying economic, political, or other causes of tension? Is power consolidated at the central level or is it decentralized? What are the power sharing agreements? Who are the key power-holders? What are their motivations? What is their base of power? What are the governance and rule of law capabilities throughout the country?</p>	<p>Design DDR programs to address security issues, but to the extent possible, try to address—or at least not exacerbate – the underlying causes of the conflict. Understand that distributing DDR benefits into a society creates winners and losers. A complementary strategy may be needed to address key power-holders. This could be diplomatic (persuasion and negotiation) or legal (amnesty or international tribunals).</p>
<p>Security environment: Is conflict ongoing? Are some areas suffering from continuing violence/instability? Are there areas or issues likely to generate tensions or renewed fighting? Have former combatants recognized the new political reality? For example, are they satisfied with the power-sharing agreement? Are there potential spoilers? What are their influences/motivations? Is there a history of civilian control over the military? What is the status of state security forces and their ability to fill security voids?</p>	<p>It is important to support DDR efforts alongside and in close coordination with the professionalization of the security sector and the development of good governance. It is important to understand the lingering motivations/drivers of conflict and instability among ex-combatants in order to design sustainable DDR programs.</p>

<p>Political will: What is the degree of political will by host nation and parties to the conflict for a cessation of hostilities and peace? What are the interests of the belligerents' leadership? What is the degree of support for DDR by the population? How do regional actors influence political will?</p>	<p>If there is insufficient political will from the parties to the conflict or the international community, proceed cautiously or not at all—any DDR programming may be unsustainable.</p>
<p>Host Country National Interest and Capabilities: What are the host country government interests in DDR? What are the host country's capabilities to develop, implement and manage a DDR program?</p>	<p>If there is sufficient political will but lack of capacity, consider assistance to build capacity in the host country to implement DDR.</p>
<p>Nature of participants in the DDR process (See Appendix 4.2: Typical Groups Involved in DDR) and determining eligibility:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ What types of forces are involved: Regular armies? Paramilitaries? Guerrillas? Allied forces? ➤ Are there DDR groups with special needs – e.g., women, child soldiers? ➤ What is the availability of weapons? ➤ Do different combatant groups have different motivations? ➤ What is the composition of groups – e.g., age, ethnic divisions, and points of origin? ➤ What is the strength of command-and-control structures? ➤ How will issues of equity between armed groups factor into DDR efforts? ➤ What is the public's perception of groups to participate in DDR (war criminals)? ➤ What funding streams and/or support systems for armed groups exist, particularly across the Diaspora? 	<p>Questions on type of participants in DDR programs allow planners to design programs in a way that is consistent with the needs of (incentives for) those demobilizing. This assessment also allows realism regarding what is feasible/not feasible in terms of DDR goals.</p> <p>Planners and negotiators need to be pragmatic regarding disarmament. In some countries, the notion of collecting small arms is a non-starter because of the availability of weapons and culture of owning a gun for defense of self and property. It might be better to focus on arms reduction and control, collection of light (and heavy) weapons, and programs that are related but distinct from DDR, like border control.</p> <p>In some instances where an adult DDR program is not possible, a program for child soldiers, war-wounded, or women associated with armed forces or groups is possible.</p>
<p>Regional context: How are external actors involved? What is their degree of influence/support on DDR? Are there cross border havens or camps? Regional spoilers?</p>	<p>Belligerent forces or safe havens located in neighboring countries can impact the willingness and speed of ex-combatants to enter into a DDR program as well as its sustainability.</p>

ASSESSING USG POLITICAL, FUNDING, AND LEGAL CONTEXT FOR DDR

In addition to an assessment of the country context and possible DDR clients, USG political, funding, and legal contexts for DDR must also be analyzed. Defining an appropriate role for the USG in DDR is dependent on a comprehensive assessment of the USG's national interests, the national interests of the host country, regional dynamics, international partner interests and funding and legal constraints as they relate to DDR programs.

CONSIDERATION OF USG NATIONAL INTERESTS

When considering whether to recommend USG involvement in a DDR effort (either through direct provision of assistance or indirect support for efforts of an international, regional or sub-regional organization), a number of factors must be evaluated related to the national interests of the USG and the degree of USG involvement in the country. These factors might include:

- Does the situation have significant U.S. national security implications?
- Does it have an impact on the U.S. regional security agenda?
- Does it put U.S. citizens at risk?
- Are there humanitarian and human rights issues that garner international attention and increase U.S. public support and USG motivation for intervention?
- Does it threaten U.S. investments or national economic interests?
- Is a significant constituency in the United States interested in this situation?
- Are there indications of U.S. public support (letters to the Ambassador, etc.)?

FUNDING ISSUES CONCERNING USG INVOLVEMENT IN DDR

***Importance of Reliable
Funding -- the Liberia Lesson:***

Ex-combatants have instigated riot in Monrovia because reintegration funds promised to soldiers were not available.

The USG role in any DDR program will also be defined in part by the resources available to support a specific aspect of the DDR process. In general, funds for DDR are not readily available and there is no single account in the USG budget that funds DDR. The Secretary of State has the policy oversight over all foreign assistance, but a number of offices within the Department of State and USAID are responsible for implementing various aspects of DDR. Available funds can be divided

into two distinct categories according to the authorities that govern their use. There are funds that can be used for the military components of DDR and funds that are strictly prohibited from supporting military purposes. These two distinct funding streams present a real coordination and management challenge for DDR, which relies on continuous planning, programming, and budgeting between disarmament, demobilization, and

reintegration efforts. This can cause severe implementation problems and/or difficulty in maintaining a timetable. (See Appendix 4.3 for specific funding constraints)

Multi-donor trust funds play an important role in financing and implementing DDR programs:

The two major international institutions that support DDR programs are the World Bank and the UN. These institutions may establish and manage DDR trust funds to which donors contribute. The advantages of working through a multilateral instrument such as a trust fund, as opposed to bilateral assistance, are that multilateral instruments:

- Ensure compatibility with all donor resources by establishing one framework for funding;
- Reduce the burden on host governments to manage and report against different individual donor requirements;
- Provide central financial management and oversight of funds;
- Avoid the possibility of “rogue DDRs,” defined as donor programs, managed outside the agreed framework that do not count against the host government’s case load of ex-combatants. Rogue DDRs often duplicate and can also undermine host government efforts;
- Provide one funding stream to support the continuum of DDR efforts; and
- Allow for political and financial burden sharing among donors.

Considerations for U.S. Government participation in multi donor trust funds include:

- World Bank trust funds often do not allow donors to earmark contributions for specific activities which can be a limiting factor for USG participation.
- The United States can participate in “parallel trust fund” mechanisms managed by the World Bank, as was done successfully in Sierra Leone’s DDR program. It allows the United States to stay coordinated with the overall management and agreed framework of the World Bank’s DDR program. However, the parallel structure creates additional work for fund managers.

ASSESSING LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON USG INVOLVEMENT IN DDR

Another critical factor that determines the level and type of USG support for DDR is the legal guidance and regulations governing intervention, as defined by U.S. laws, administrative directives and sanctions. It is not possible to provide a comprehensive list of such restrictions, in part

Appropriate legal guidance should be obtained before committing USG funds in support of DDR.

because the application of such restrictions can change depending upon the factual circumstances. Below is a short checklist of some of the most important restrictions. In addition to overarching legal constraints, USG DDR planners must understand which funding accounts can be used for which types of DDR activities (See Appendix 4.3). Using transfer authorities and waiver provisions, the President and Secretary of State can

authorize, in certain circumstances, the transfer of funds between accounts (e.g. from Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)), thereby providing additional flexibility. If this occurs late in the budget cycle (i.e. in the later summer or fall of a given year), funds may not be available for transfer. In addition, some funding sources have “notwithstanding authority” that will allow funds to be spent notwithstanding specific legal restrictions. Below are some key questions to be answered in consultation with Department of State/Legal Affairs and USAID’s General Counsel before committing USG funds to support DDR:

Illustrative Legal Consideration	Possible Planning Implication
U.S. law prohibits knowingly providing USG support to designated terrorists and terrorist organizations or in the furtherance of terrorist activities.	If there is a risk that DDR funding might benefit designated terrorists/terrorist organizations or further terrorist activity, then policy offices should consult with counsel on how to proceed in a manner consistent with U.S. law.
Is the country in question designated a state sponsor of terrorism?	Also may limit possibility for donor assistance; policy offices should consult with counsel.
Are there Congressional mandates prohibiting the funding of certain operations or in specific countries?	Same as above. May also have an impact on the type of USG involvement in DDR (e.g., only support to reintegration activities)
Generally each USG agency has specific spending authorities and prohibitions. Do the envisioned activities fall within the spending authority of the agency involved? Has the recipient met the legal conditions to receive ESF or DA assistance? This point is particularly relevant for USAID-provided assistance.	Neither DA nor ESF can be used for military purposes, therefore USAID funds cannot be used for disarmament (and some demobilization) activities. However in DDR planning, special attention must be paid to creating continuity of effort between D, D, and R, even if different agencies/international partners are responsible for different phases.
Because of the potential for fraud and corruption in a post-conflict setting, should assistance be funneled through a third party, such as a non-governmental organization (NGO)?	Funneling assistance through a third party can take away from national ownership of the DDR process – this may have long-term implications for sustainability of DDR programming.

2.2 DETERMINING THE USG ROLE AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

Following the analysis of information gathered during the assessment phase, USG planners must define the nature and extent of the USG role, and how USG involvement will be managed. This is a challenging task because of the range of actors involved in DDR processes—from national and local authorities, international organizations (IOs),

non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and bilateral partners to regional organizations, ex-combatants and local communities. Different actors play various roles and the roles will vary case by case.

The USG has vast experience in providing strategic and operational support to DDR programs all over the world and is well-positioned to influence DDR processes politically through various means, including diplomatic engagement in peace negotiations and assistance to IO and national-level planning for DDR. The USG can also provide a range of operational support. For example, through USAID the USG has supported reintegration aspects of DDR since the 1980s. The role the US plays in any DDR program directly depends on US national interests and available capacities (financial, human, and technical) to take on various aspects of DDR (see previous section on Assessing a Country Context) as well as roles and responsibilities shared with international partners.

Determining the USG Role and Management Structure:

- *Basic Models of DDR Management*
- *Models for USG Involvement in DDR*
- *Illustrative Outline of Types of USG Strategic and Operational DDR Support*

BASIC MODELS FOR DDR MANAGEMENT

The overall management of DDR processes typically takes one of the following forms:

- 1) **National Institution:** The host country has the lead and establishes a national institution responsible for the design, implementation, and management of the DDR process. In some cases, the host country works with other actors who coordinate international donor assistance - the World Bank (e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Eritrea), a specific donor country that plays a lead (but not exclusive role - e.g. Afghanistan DDR - Japan), multi-donor trust funds or regional or international institutions (e.g. United Nations in Liberia, Haiti, Mozambique). In other cases, a country takes the initiative to manage, fund and carry out DDR with relatively little assistance from the international community (e.g. Angola).

In each model for DDR Management, international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can play an important role in supporting the management and implementation of DDR.

- 2) **Regional or International Institution:** Regional or international institutions have the lead for implementation of various aspects of a DDR program. (e.g., the United Nations, the African Union etc.).

- 3) **Coalitions and/or Multiple Donors and Programs:** No lead actor is identified. Coordination becomes complicated and the host government is often burdened by duplicative requests for information. May also lead to duplicative or overlapping funding schemes.

With each of these models international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can play an important role in supporting the management and implementation of DDR.

MODELS FOR USG INVOLVEMENT IN DDR

In most circumstances, the USG will not have full institutional responsibility for the design, development, and implementation of DDR programs. While the USG can take the lead, more often it plays a supporting role by providing strategic and programmatic support in collaboration with the international community to various aspects of the process. USG involvement typically falls into the following categories:

Types of USG Engagement	Issues to Consider
USG in the Lead	Rare; costly; long time commitment necessary for successful DDR programming
Support to a UN Peacekeeping Mission	Most common; can be authorized under either Chapter VI or VII of the United Nations Charter. Peacekeeping operation budgets do not cover reintegration costs; these costs must be covered by voluntary contributions from donors. Lag in providing funds (often because of lags in assessed contributions) can disrupt DDR implementation.
Support to Regional Organizations	Increasingly important; regional organization capacity to implement DDR programming is often limited.
Involvement in International Financial Institutions (IFI) Processes (Contact Group, Donor Group, etc.)	Increasingly important; good mechanism for donor coordination; USG participation in Multi Donor Trust Funds is difficult. There is a tension between USG’s desire to exercise full control over how the money is spent and the IFI’s preference to aggregate donor funds and maintain flexibility during implementation.
“Do-Nothing” Option	If political commitment to the peace agreement is low or if ex-combatants perceive DDR as entitlement to short-term benefits for ending fighting, rather than a commitment to future peace, the USG should consider not supporting DDR. Note: Opportunities may be available to address special target groups.

ILLUSTRATIVE TYPES OF USG STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL DDR SUPPORT

Various situations present different opportunities to support DDR programs. In the area of diplomacy, a USG representative may initiate or assist in facilitating ceasefire or negotiation efforts relevant to DDR. Support may include technical guidance for specific aspects of an agreement or providing “good offices” for discussions. Diplomatic pressure on neighboring nations can also be employed. Once an agreement is reached, the USG is in a position to give technical, logistical, financial and other assistance to DDR efforts across the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration spectrum. For example, USAID has extensive experience in programming for community-based reintegration.

2.3 STRATEGIC DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

Following the analysis of information gathered during the assessment phase and based on the USG role and management structure for DDR, planners must determine a strategic approach and implementation plan for DDR activities. Strategic design and implementation includes clarity on procedures, timing, and beneficiaries. Design of DDR programs is most often linked to a peace process, and the basic parameters for DDR programs are often detailed in a negotiated settlement or peace accord. Included in the sections below are overarching strategic design and implementation lessons learned for DDR planning.

Strategic Design and Implementation includes:

- *Peace Process*
- *Disarmament and Demobilization*
- *Reinsertion and Reintegration*

PEACE PROCESS

The promise of DDR and the integration of formerly competing fighting forces into a new national armed force often play an integral part in reaching a peace agreement. The role of outside actors as external guarantors is particularly important throughout negotiations and implementation. Historically, mediators have (at least implicitly) recognized the role DDR plays in breaking the security dilemma posed by belligerent parties that do not trust one another. Unfortunately, while peace accords sometimes refer to DDR, and almost always to security sector reform and political power sharing, very little negotiating time is usually given to *how* DDR or security sector reform will be accomplished, much less the linkages between the two. If negotiations do not provide a fairly detailed sense of how DDR will unfold, then ill-defined expectations can cause disappointment. This can leave a peace deal vulnerable to spoilers and skeptics at those fragile moments preceding real consolidation of peace.

The following is a lessons-learned checklist for DDR planning to be considered in a peace process:

☑ **Begin strategic design and planning early:** It is critical that DDR planning be considered early on in an overarching reconstruction and stabilization plan and prior to the start of peace negotiations, since peace agreements frequently include provisions that will determine key aspects of DDR programs.

☑ **Determine political will and resources (financial, human and technical) available to support DDR planning and implementation:** Political will is a requirement for DDR – leaders and ex-combatants must be committed to resolving the conflict and the community must be willing to accept ex-combatants. Political will ensures buy-in to the process and its completion. If political will is absent, planners should consider limiting U.S. involvement.

☑ **Identify funding sources early for all stages of the DDR process:** Costs are often underestimated. The resulting shortfalls not only harm the DDR process but the peace process as well.

☑ **The USG planning team should include both policy and technical experts:** The planning team should have the capacity to address all phases of a DDR program. The team should include both Washington and field-based representatives.

☑ **Integrate DDR design and implementation into larger reconstruction and stabilization strategy:** Focus on linking DDR goals and timetable with other key R&S tasks (i.e. with security sector reform (SSR), justice sector reform, economic development strategies, and elections and political processes).

☑ **Ensure that representatives of fighting forces participate in the planning process.** It is important to have access to host country and opposition leadership for consultations. Program design should take into account their views, and also change with the local economic circumstances and conditions of ex-combatants re-entering the civilian economy.

☑ **Define Factions/Groups to Participate in DDR Programs:** Determine the legitimate and essential beneficiaries of DDR.

Linking DDR and SSR:

Depending on the country context, the sequencing and linkages of SSR and DDR processes can vary in accordance with the broader political objectives of the transition. SSR basically entails reform of the military -- downsizing formal state military structures and related elements and submitting them to civilian control. SSR also means reform of the civilian police -- the extension of state authority to re-establish law and order. It is difficult to identify candidates for DDR without a clear understanding of the size and profile of future security forces. Information collected from DDR during the vetting of combatants can also inform the SSR process. Ideally, a peace agreement would explicitly link DDR and SSR program timelines and goals.

☑ **Include support to DDR bodies:** The peace accord should be realistic in specifying timing and expectations for any national-level DDR oversight bodies—they will need to be professional, neutral, and credible to all signatories.

☑ **Identify any legal constraints:** The USG must be clear on the legal implications of its involvement in DDR activities. (See Sec 2.1 Assessing Legal Constraints on USG Involvements in DDR)

☑ **Design DDR programs to fit beneficiaries:** DDR benefits for commanders, mid-level commanders, and rank and file should address the specific needs of each group. The needs of special groups such as child soldiers, women, and wounded should be identified. “Gender neutral” programs can disadvantage victimized populations – like women and children – because they do not take into account cultural biases or stigmas for reintegration.

☑ **Determine options for dealing with spoilers:** Planners should identify potential spoilers and their impact on the DDR program. When possible, a spoiler strategy should be included in peace dialogue, and outstanding security concerns should be recognized and addressed in the DDR strategy.

☑ **Include a plan for strategic communication:** The terms of the peace plan and distribution of benefits must be communicated as soon as possible to government officials, local populations and to members of the fighting forces in order to manage expectations and break necessary command-and-control structures.

☑ **Outline the phasing between D, D, and R:** The timing and sequencing of D, D, and R need to be included in the strategic plan. It is important to plan simultaneously for the reintegration phase and design benchmarks of progress for the entire DDR program.

☑ **Clarify issues of amnesty in the Peace Accord:):** Amnesty issues figure prominently in promoting reconciliation in reintegration efforts. The Peace Accord should detail any qualifying factors and conditions for amnesty, such as a **Truth and Reconciliation Commission**.

☑ **Promoting ‘social equity’:** Close attention must be paid to community perceptions of former combatants. Difficulties can arise if former combatants, at times guilty of human rights abuses, are “rewarded” with benefits while impoverished communities receive nothing. Programs should be designed to provide incentives for both former combatants and receiving communities.

☑ **Include a timetable and a monitoring and evaluation system in the planning process:** Indicators for DDR program monitoring and evaluation should be developed during the planning process. Funding and a timetable for data collection on program progress should also be included.

DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION

Planning for disarmament and demobilization typically represents the first phase of implementation of DDR. Unless comprehensive disarmament takes place, large numbers of arms will remain in the hands of ex-combatants, criminals and civilians, increasing the possibility of armed banditry and a continuation of violent conflict. Disarmament and arms management programs must be put in place at both the national and community level throughout the DDR process and following its implementation. Disarmament is politically sensitive and highly context specific – it is essential to ensure that provisions for the disarmament of ex-combatants, and ideally the wider community, is included as a component of peace accords.

The objective of demobilization is to assist ex-combatants in the process of returning to civilian life in a secure, reconciliatory and peaceful environment.¹ For true demobilization, an explicit link to a sustainable reintegration program is needed. Demobilization may include disarmament, encampment, registration, orientation, vetting (profiling), health and psychological assessment and counseling.

The following information should be gathered to guide design and implementation of demobilization and disarmament:

Assessment Questions	Possible Implications for Planning
Determine if the goal is partial or complete disarmament	<p>Partial disarmament may be a good option in a culture that highly values guns. Be prepared to explain how partial, rather than full, disarmament can make a difference.</p> <p>Match to available resources and design accordingly.</p>
Determine the security context and size of demobilizing forces	<p>Cantonment or encampment is essentially a security requirement and not a mandatory requirement for the DDR process. It should only be considered when the security context indicates that it is necessary. When cantonment is deemed necessary, it is essential to keep the period of encampment short.</p> <p>The security environment will also dictate the need for observers and peacekeepers as part of demobilization and may influence sequencing of demobilization site openings around the country/region.</p>

¹ UNDP, Practice Note: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants,” 2005.

Assessment Questions	Possible Implications for Planning
Determine the DDR beneficiary base: senior leadership, commanders, sub-commanders, and/or foot soldiers; special groups (children, women, war-wounded)	Resource and planning implications – overlay with needs of special groups (i.e. women, children.)
Determine types and number of weapons to be collected	Match to available resources and design accordingly
Determine availability of weapons – i.e. smuggling/black market prices, trans-border arms trades, etc.	Link with security sector reform. Possibly sequence DDR after initial SSR.

The following is a list of lessons learned in disarmament and demobilization design and implementation:

☑ Plan for Assembly Areas/Cantonment Sites/Demobilization Centers:

- Sites should be accessible, secure and have general amenities, storage facilities/armories for disarmament sites and communications infrastructure.
- Experts such as NATO-trained Ammunition and Technical officers must be present from the outset of the disarmament process.
- Ensure border security where relevant.
- Transparency in the collection, storage and destruction of weapons and ammunition is crucial to ensure weapons will not return to circulation, and contributes to confidence building.
- When applicable, create facilities that appropriately assure the security of women and children and that assist the dissolution of command and control structures.
- Stays at cantonment sites should be as short as possible.

☑ Plan for needs assessment/vetting of demobilized populations:

- The collection of personal and socio-economic data provides baseline information for the planning, implementation and subsequent monitoring and evaluation of the ex-combatants during their reintegration.
- Consider implications for amnesty: Are war crimes an issue? Initial and continual vetting of ex-combatants will be necessary, including vetting for any information suggesting a risk of recidivism.
- Determine eligibility for military or police service: Will they be eligible or ineligible for either restructured, professionalized police or military service? What is the timing and sequencing for security sector reform and DDR?
- Assess ex-combatants social profiles and socio-economic priorities to help fulfill expectations for successful reintegration.

- Consider a database for tracking DDR participants (management information system) if technically feasible and can be protected from possible sensitivities related to its use.
- Determine conditions at possible reintegration sites – how do communities feel about ex-combatants? What are the socio-economic conditions? Will there be monitoring challenges?
- Determine special needs for women – including former combatants, sex slaves etc.
- Note: Child soldiers may be demobilized at any time irrespective of the state of a peace process.

☑ Establish a Plan for Weapons Collection, Storage, and Destruction:

Decide who will have responsibility/mandate for weapons collection, security of weapons collection points, disposal/destruction of weapons, and storage of weapons (including security). It is important to carefully record markings on the weapon as the weapon is collected so that it can be accounted for until it is destroyed.

***Competitive buy-backs?
The Liberia and Cote D'Ivoire Lessons:***

Liberia and Cote D'Ivoire both introduced weapons buy back schemes in 2004. Cote D'Ivoire offered three times as much money per gun. This caused a large inflow of weapons into Cote D'Ivoire from Liberia.

☑ Consider rites of passage for demobilized soldiers: Develop mechanisms for symbolic transformation from military to civilian life – recognition of military service, medal or ceremony – if possible given the political and judicial context. In certain cases it may be important to require that participants formally renounce in writing their association with a group or cause. This may be the point when the USG considers combatants “officially” demobilized – significant legal benchmark for use of USG funds (reintegration officially begins).

☑ Establish a realistic and flexible timetable and link it to reintegration:

- Spell out the objective, timeline, and process for disarmament as combatants are likely to want assurance of reintegration benefits upon turning in weapons.
- Determine the need for, and recipients of, transition benefits pending commencement of reintegration programs. Consider transitional safety allowances (distributed to combatants) that are not monetized but instead composed of items such as food, civilian clothing, household goods, building materials and medical assistance.

☑ Implement post-demobilization, arms control mechanisms – be aware of regional security context:

Develop arms control incentives for post-demobilization operations. An initial demobilization often leaves many weapons behind. Mechanisms including “turn-in,” “buy-back,” “swap,” or “weapons-for-development” programs may be warranted as part of larger SSR planning. However, reliance on incentive programs

without the right security conditions has the potential to stimulate illicit arms trade and encourage cross-border trafficking.

Design a transportation plan if necessary: Determine transportation needs and ensure that a transportation system is ready to transport soldiers from field locations to disarmament sites to demobilization centers to reinsertion locations. Determine if this will include transportation for family members and others.

REINSERTION AND REINTEGRATION

Reintegration is the key to sustainable peace. While disarmament and demobilization are time-bound, reintegration is an ongoing process. Reintegration should address the economic and social needs of ex-combatants, focusing on providing economic skills and opportunities that promote reconciliation within the communities where ex-combatants settle. Reintegration programs generally have two component phases, short- to medium-term, and long-term. In the short-term, the primary objective of reintegration is to create a sufficient level of security that enables the peace process to move forward. Inevitably, planners will face trade offs between moving quickly to keep ex-combatants employed and providing long-term economic opportunities for ex-combatants and their communities. It is crucial to remember that if communities are not economically viable, it will be very difficult for ex-combatants to find sustainable employment which may lead ex-combatants to return to arms.

The following are assessment questions to guide the design and implementation of reinsertion and reintegration programs:

Assessment Questions	Possible Implications for Planning
Who are the ex-combatants? Men? Women? Child soldiers? (see assessment questions in section 2.1)	Target resources to groups most essential to keeping the peace and those particularly vulnerable (e.g. children).
Ex-combatants' preferences for return: Rural vs. urban resettlement? What are their livelihood preferences? Do they have political needs – decision-making opportunities (in many countries ex-combatants become legitimate political parties/local leaders)?	Take the time to understand ex-combatants' preferences – it will affect the success of the program.

Assessment Questions	Possible Implications for Planning
<p>Economy - Job creation: What are the potentially profitable sectors within the economy to target for sustainable job creation? (Natural resources, agriculture, textiles, etc.) Constraints to economic growth: Lack of legal/regulatory framework, banks, infrastructure, etc.? DDR program impact on the economy: Will it displace non-traditional workers like women in the economy?</p>	<p>Reintegration planning must take into account short-term goals of maintaining stability and medium and longer-term efforts toward sustainable peace. Job creation should focus on sectors that will give combatants long-term opportunities for income generation.</p>
<p>Mapping of communities: What are the ethnic, social, and cultural barriers to sustainable reintegration? What are the attitudes of community members toward ex-combatants? Absorptive capacity of local communities/economies? What are the implications of social equity between ex-combatants and communities?</p>	<p>Begin planning process with the deepest understanding of the local social context as possible.</p>
<p>Ongoing assistance programs (i.e. training, micro finance): Can these programs be expanded to include ex-combatants? Parallel national recovery programs: What types are required? How do they affect the DDR plan?</p>	<p>Look throughout the interagency community and other development programs supported by donors, international organizations or international financial institutions to see whether preferential hiring of ex-combatants is possible.</p>

Reintegration programs can be designed in three basic ways: to fit the needs of an individual, the needs of the broader community, or both. Some programs provide both types of benefits.

- 1) **Individual-based:** Individual-based benefits packages provide cash, training, and/or in-kind supplies directly to ex-combatants. Training and educational programs can also be part of the benefits package.

- 2) **Community-based:** Community-based benefits packages allow members of the community who were not fighters to benefit, for example, through the building of large-scale reconstruction projects (schools, roads, etc.) or the creation of youth and sports clubs. This approach fosters reconciliation, is particularly valuable when ex-combatants may not have been welcomed back to their communities, facilitates transition to longer-term development and supports local-level decision-making. However, this approach may be less likely to convince combatants to demobilize and disarm.

PHASE 1: SHORT TO MEDIUM-TERM REINTEGRATION OR “REINSERTION”

The goal of short-term reintegration (often called “reinsertion”) assistance is to keep ex-combatants off the streets and to break command and control structures between the rank and file and their commanders. The objective of short-term reinsertion assistance is primarily to provide ex-combatants with the following:

- Transitional assistance and training;
- Sufficient skills to build a new life;
- An opportunity to begin the process of long-term reintegration; and
- A means of changing to civilian identity through education and skill development.

Reinsertion also provides society at large with improved security by:

- Removing weapons from circulation;
- Reducing influence of commanders over troops; and
- Changing the habits of ex-combatants.

Below are lessons-learned for the first phase—short- to medium-term reintegration (reinsertion):

☑ Determine size and composition of assistance packages to promote sustainable reintegration: Reintegration packages must be attractive to ex-combatants to create incentives to disarm but tailored to promote long-term reintegration and community acceptance.

☑ Provide immediate assistance to ex-combatants for transfer to civilian life: Assistance includes food, clothing, and personal items, housing material, medical care, basic household goods, severance pay and counseling. Ex-combatants should be provided basic education, vocational training, and job placement services that are directly linked to income-generating activities.

☑ Structure the distribution of benefits: The distribution of benefits should be structured in a way that does not allow commanders to use pressure, coercion or other means to usurp the benefits owed to the rank and file. These networks, if left intact, could continue to operate as criminal or terrorist networks.

PHASE 2: LONG-TERM REINTEGRATION

The goal of long-term reintegration is sustainable livelihoods that help promote peaceful and secure communities. Long-term reintegration helps ex-combatants become socially and economically embedded in their communities. At this point, they cease to receive targeted benefits as ex-combatants but are eligible for development assistance available to the broader community.

Long-term reintegration assistance can include:

- Job generation;
- Job placement;
- Longer-term training and education;
- Promoting ex-combatant involvement in community political life;
- Credit programs;
- Agricultural extension services; and
- Counseling.

☑ **Link the reintegration program with economic development/reform:** Job and skills training must be tailored to fit the demand of the job market. Often, economies in post-conflict countries are devastated by the war and have little ability to absorb new workers. Programs should consider innovative solutions that help expand and transform the economy.

☑ **Engage private sector:** National government should offer incentives (such as tax breaks or subsidies) for private industry to hire ex-combatants, including through apprenticeship programs.

☑ **Promote micro finance and small business development:** International Financial Institutions (IFIs), bilateral partners, NGOs, and national microcredit agencies can set up financial service programs and training for start-up businesses. National authorities and local NGOs are better positioned to reach remote populations to give funding. Microfinance for ex-combatants still requires viable business activities or funds will be wasted. It is generally advisable to have an “ex-combatant window” in microfinance or small business activities that are open to broader communities, not just ex-combatants.

☑ **Promote ex-combatant involvement in political life:** Reintegration efforts are more likely to be sustainable if ex-combatants are able to take part in decision-making/local leadership within their communities.

☑ **Promote linkages with development portfolio:** Whenever possible, ex-combatants should benefit from USG programs already operating in country. For example, USAID

Linking DDR and Development:

DDR is not a development program. However, DDR programs should take into account broader development goals, focus on approaches that will be sustainable, and be compatible with other reintegration programs underway or planned (e.g. for returning IDPs or refugees). DDR programs must be designed with awareness of the level of development in a country including the economy's capacity to employ new workers and willingness of communities to accept ex-combatants. DDR programs should train ex-combatants in skills that are demanded by the local economy and be designed to foster reconciliation with the community. DDR programming must provide a sustainable route for ex-combatants into the job market and provide jobs quickly. If unemployment is generally high in an economy or in areas where ex-combatants have resettled, it will be more difficult for those going through DDR to be reintegrated successfully.

Missions should consider how ex-combatants might be absorbed into ongoing programs as an interim step.

2.4 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

A plan for monitoring and evaluating DDR programs should be incorporated into DDR design from the outset. Understanding progress made in DDR must be based on both input/output and impact

indicators and be informed by qualitative and quantitative data. Indicators must measure not only input/output data (for example: number of ex-combatants trained, number of ex-combatants demobilized) but more importantly, higher-level outcome indicators of longer-term impact and sustainability of the DDR program (i.e. contributions to overall peace and stability; for example, the number of ex-combatants participating in local political processes, the percentage of ex-combatants reporting satisfaction with job). Tracking of ex-combatants is also important for maintaining a handle on the current security situation and ensuring that ex-combatants are held accountable for agreements made. Regular M&E can provide a way to identify and make midcourse corrections in DDR programming.

Monitoring and Evaluation:

- *Output/Input vs. Outcome/Impact Indicators*
- *Lessons-Learned in Developing a DDR Metrics Plan*

INPUT/OUTPUT VS. OUTCOME/IMPACT INDICATORS

Limitations of input/output indicators: Some very specific quantitative indicators (e.g., number of troops demobilized) will help to immediately identify the scope of a DDR program. However, these

indicators are limited when describing the *impact* of a DDR program and the success of reintegration. Better indicators would be “number of combatants reunified with their families” or “number who own homes or businesses.”

Qualitative analysis – The Colombia Lesson:

In Colombia, a qualitative sense of the success of the reintegration program has been gained through polling community members..

LESSONS-LEARNED IN DEVELOPING A DDR METRICS PLAN

☑ Develop metrics early:

Metrics to monitor and evaluate the DDR program must be developed early during the DDR planning process.

☑ Base metrics on objectives:

Metrics must measure against the overall objectives for the DDR program and the wider stabilization and reconstruction strategy.

☑ Budget for metrics:

Build the cost of metrics into the budget for operations. Determine funding for both quantitative and qualitative data collection.

☑ Design metrics using a phased strategy:

Indicators are needed for short (first 12 months), medium (12 months to 2 years), and long-term (two to seven years) timeframes. Most impact indicators will not show progress before the medium to long term but should be tracked from the beginning so trends are apparent.

☑ Build monitoring into DDR program:

Build oversight schemes into reintegration programs. For example, a benefit program that requires ex-combatants to check-in regularly in order to receive benefits.

☑ Design indicators for tasks and overall progress:

Indicators for DDR should be in place for each task (demobilization, disarmament and reintegration) in addition to and distinct from DDR's contribution to overall progress in the R&S operation. Be mindful that a failed DDR program can exist due to external factors/failure in sectors beyond the scope of DDR even where indicators show progress.

☑ Factors outside of traditional DDR are important to DDR success:

Indicators have to incorporate measurement of sustainable factors within a region that will allow various components of DDR to move forward.

- Samples of indicators of relevant factors outside of DDR:
 - Willingness of businessmen to hire ex-combatants;
 - Growth in sector associated with economic development/reintegration plan (i.e. construction, textiles etc.); and
 - Polling related to how communities feel about perpetrators of conflict.

- Factors outside of DDR that are important for success of DDR programs:
 - Ability to counter the recruitment of youth to perpetrate violence or crime;

Failure to account for Vital External Factors-- the Haiti Lesson:

In Haiti, a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) program was in place for DDR, including focus groups and surveys that tracked outcomes for participants. However, DDR planners did not integrate important external factors in its monitoring calculus, nor ground it sufficiently within the larger peacebuilding and development context. The indicators reflected a successful program even though it did not result in reintegrating the ex-combatants in a sustainable manner due to the stagnant economy, or in a lastingly disarmed and demobilized force due to the lack of a robust security sector.

- Economic viability; potential to provide jobs in the long-term;
- Regional context;
- Sectarian, ethnic tension; and
- Security sector reform.

3. CASE STUDIES: SUMMARY OF USG EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS-LEARNED

Below are concise case study summaries that reflect USG experience in supporting and managing DDR processes in specific countries. These case studies are not academic research papers. Rather, they are the reflections of a select number of practitioners who were involved first-hand in DDR processes in these countries.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

The U.S.-brokered Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) of November 1995 brought an end to the bitter three-year ethnic war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a republic of the former Yugoslavia which had disintegrated in the early 1990s. The DPA created a decentralized state based on two entities, the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (RS) and the Bosniak (Muslim)-Croat Federation. A weak national government with a rotating presidency was created. None of the warring parties were satisfied with the settlement, but Bosnia's people, economy and social structure were devastated and the country was ready for peace. Moreover, Bosnia's two important neighbors, Serbia and Croatia, which had abetted the warfare in Bosnia, also wanted to end the conflict.

A 60,000-strong (20,000 U.S.) NATO-backed Implementation Force (IFOR) was deployed to Bosnia in December 1996 to help implement the DPA. IFOR, unlike previous UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and elsewhere, was deployed with robust rules of engagement under Chapter VII guidelines (UN Resolution 1301), which designated the Commander of IFOR (COMIFOR) as the "final arbiter" in theater regarding interpretation of the military aspects of the DPA. IFOR's primary and near-term role under Annex 1A of the DPA was to stabilize the cease-fire, separate the warring forces, oversee the cantonment of troops and heavy weapons, and demobilize the remaining forces -- including Bosniak, Serb and Croat forces, approximately 322,000 troops at the end of the war.

Annex 1B of the settlement, meanwhile, called for confidence and security measures and for sub-regional arms control initiatives to be undertaken under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The U.S. undertook Train and Equip (T&E) initiatives with the Bosniak-Croat Federation forces to bring them into greater symmetry with Serb forces in the RS, wean Bosniak armed forces off Islamic state assistance, help integrate the Bosniak and Croat factions of the Federation army, and ultimately help persuade the Bosniaks to sign on to the DPA.

Disarmament of the separate military forces was not undertaken, in part because the Bosniaks, attacked during the war by both Serb and Croat forces, would not consider

disarmament schemes. The international community, too, stung by its own passivity during the war and ensuing massacres, supported downsizing rather than disarmament. Buy-back/turn-in campaigns (e.g., Operation Harvest) also were undertaken by IFOR/SFOR to remove small arms and explosives from the civilian population. NATO ultimately committed to setting up a fund to help finance the re-insertion of demobilized Bosnian soldiers back into civilian life.

The Federation and RS governments, backed by World Bank and IMF funding, were responsible for the reintegration of demobilized soldiers back into Bosnian society. Pensions and preferential hiring for public works projects were the main tools utilized to mollify war veterans mostly concerned about their economic prospects in an economy with approximately 40 percent unemployment. While quiescent for the most part, Serb and Croat veteran organizations regularly staged protests demanding that the governments fulfill its promises and obligations regarding veteran benefits.

The NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Bosnia was a success, although more could have been done by IFOR and its successor SFOR (Stabilization Force) in the years immediately following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords to provide protection for refugee return and to arrest indicted war criminals. Original time-tables for peace-keeping termination had to be discarded and an indefinite extension to U.S. force participation in IFOR was granted by President Clinton, after a year of participation initially authorized and a one-year extension. The cease-fire was consolidated, foreign forces--for the most part--departed the country, weapons and forces were secured and accounted for in cantonments, and armed forces from all sides were progressively demobilized. At the end of 1997, the force level was down to 86,000 from over 300,000 at wars end; it now stands at approximately 12,000. IFOR/SFOR was able to reduce its number of troops from 60,000 to 30,000 in 1997 and to 7,000 at the end of the SFOR mandate in 2004. European Union forces (EUFOR) succeeded the NATO-led force. A regional arms control agreement, meanwhile, was reached among Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia that set numerical ceilings on heavy weapons. Perhaps most impressive – and unforeseen in the early post-war years – was the ability of U.S. and NATO officials to forge an agreement in 2005 that established an integrated military command that will combine Bosnia’s three military forces. Bosnia in 2006 has a myriad of problems and ethnic conflict is still possible, but an outbreak of organized violence on behalf of the armed forces is not foreseen. The country has entered preliminary negotiations with the EU and has met all

Lessons-Learned -- Key Factors of DDR Success in Bosnia:

- *Deployment of robust combat-ready peacekeeping force with a mandate to use force when/if needed;*
- *Regional cooperation by Serbia and Croatia with peace implementation at the strategic level;*
- *Coordination post-1997 between military and civilian sectors to implement peace accords; and*
- *Former warring armed forces were not dismantled, but downsized, and efforts were undertaken to reform, transform and engage them in the peace process.*

conditions for entry into NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program except for apprehension of prominent war crimes' indictees.

DDR success in Bosnia can be attributed in part to IFOR/SFOR's robust rules of engagement, which warned off possible belligerents, and signaled the political seriousness and willingness of the U.S. and international community to establish peace in Bosnia. Collaboration between SFOR command and civilian implementations of the DPA after 1997, although imperfect, was also important to success. The internationally-appointed High Representative had the power to remove from office civilian and military officials deemed to be in violation of the DPA. The general absence of spoilers -- except in minor cases among the Bosnian Croats -- among military commanders also facilitated implementation of the military aspects of the peace accords. The attraction of EU and NATO membership, as well as economic imperatives, meanwhile, encouraged progress toward the downsizing and integration of Bosnia's armed forces.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The Democratic Republic of the Congo went through a multi-dimensional war between 1998 and 2002, involving both national and foreign forces. Among the many provisions of the Lusaka Peace Accord, signed in 1999, were two distinct DDR programs: 1) a voluntary DDR program for the Rwandan Hutu "genocidaires" hiding in east Congo, led and implemented by the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo (MONUC), and 2) a national DDR plan for the Congolese national army and rebel/militia soldiers, led by the newly unified national transitional government and funded by an international trust fund (Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP)) set up by the World Bank. The USG was not the lead in either DDR case, but was heavily involved through the embassy and U.S. Department of State's Africa Bureau in pushing through the Lusaka Accord and pressuring the parties to cooperate on DDR. The United States indirectly funded the first DDR program by virtue of being the largest donor to MONUC. In the second program, the United States chose to keep its DDR funds (small amounts) with USAID rather than pooling funds with the rest of the donors in the MDRP Fund.

Lessons-Learned -- Key Obstacles to DDR Success in the DRC:

- *The lack of national capacity, both in terms of technical ability and political will.*
- *Overlooking in the planning process the importance of support to security sector reform (SSR) in advancing DDR efforts. With a failure of SSR, the DDR efforts were paralyzed.*

The first DDR program, targeting Rwandan Hutus, was a failure due to lack of foresight regarding the reluctance of Hutu "genocidaires" to voluntarily return to a Tutsi-governed Rwanda. This approach is currently being reexamined, with the goal of adding a coercive element.

The second DDR program, involving national forces, has been blocked up until now by a lack of progress on security sector reform (SSR), which is important because it

determines the number of soldiers who will remain in the military and conversely, the number who need civilian jobs. Both SSR and DDR were to be led by two national “Joint Commissions” (a mix of government and former rebel/militia leaders) and chaired by a UN representative. Ultimately, the weak and divided transitional government of DRC has not been able to make the necessary SSR and DDR decisions, and without stronger leadership from the international community, DDR is unlikely to succeed.

East Timor

The East Timor intervention began with a UN Chapter VII regional coalition led by Australia and was followed by a UN peacekeeping operation called UNTAET. In the wake of Indonesia’s withdrawal from East Timor, which removed the main belligerent force from the country, the UN took the extraordinary measure of establishing a Transitional Authority to govern East Timor. With Indonesia gone, the remaining threat to peace and stability was the East Timorese freedom fighters called the Falintil, numbering roughly 2,000.

The International Organization for Migration managed a comprehensive DDR program for ex-Falintil soldiers. This program was designed prior to the peace agreement, which allowed for quick and effective implementation. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) led the reintegration efforts for 1,308 ex-fighters by providing a transitional safety net of \$500 and a package of job training and/or seed money for start up business activities. At the same time, an elite core of ex-

Falintil soldiers was tapped to create the East Timor Defense Force. The decision to utilize the talents of ex-freedom fighters was important because it brought them into the peace process and lowered the risk of their becoming spoilers. The leader of the freedom fighters was selected to lead the East Timor Defense Force and was involved in every aspect of DDR. His popularity and authority allowed him to make tough strategic and operational decisions that were not questioned.

Lessons-Learned – Key Factors of DDR Success in East Timor:

- *The relatively small number of soldiers to reintegrate;*
- *Strong local ownership of the process;*
- *A high-level of commitment and early involvement of the donor community;*
and
- *Parallel planning and establishment of DDR and SSR programs.*

El Salvador

The civil war in El Salvador between the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the government began in 1981 and ended in 1992 with the UN supported Chapultepec Agreement. The civil war was the result of the economic marginalization, social segregation, and political repression of the country’s poor rural population by the

Lessons-Learned-- the El Salvador experience demonstrates the critical need for:

- *Including women in the design and implementation of DDR programs*
- *Rapid delivery of basic needs to get ex-combatants to “buy-in” to the process*
- *Long-term reintegration plans (i.e. land reform) that are sustainable and reflective of ex-combatant needs.*

“coffee elite” who controlled most of the land. After a decade, the FMLN and the oligarchy grew weary of continuing the war and with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had supported the FMLN, both realized that compromise and reconciliation were the only way to peace. The Chapultepec Agreement detailed processes for ceasefire, disarmament, and demobilization.

El Salvador’s post-war reconstruction plan, which included reintegration of ex-combatants, was called the Peace and National Recovery (NRP) program. The

NRP provided training and technical assistance in agriculture and small business development for over 107,000 ex-combatants and civilians. Additionally it gave nearly 93,900 loans for agriculture and microenterprise. USAID was the largest contributor to the program (\$304 million as of 1994²). Other countries and organizations including the World Bank, UNDP, EU, Germany, and Japan also made substantial contributions.

USAID's support included training 60,000 beneficiaries, titling of land to more than 31,000 ex-combatants, implementation of more than 2,000 small infrastructure projects and a wide selection of projects benefiting more than 20,000 ex-combatants, including counseling, training, scholarships and agricultural credit. By September 1995, over 19,000 ex-combatants from both sides received vocational, agricultural or microenterprise training. More than 11,000 received a microenterprise or agricultural credit, and thousands of individuals wounded in the war received surgery and specialized treatment, prosthetic devices, and rehabilitation.³

Women made up 11% of the total ex-combatants. Women’s inclusion in many levels of negotiations ensured that they and other marginalized members of society had equal access to benefits. The diffusion of benefits bolstered sustainability of the reintegration and reconstruction process.⁴

The short-term phases of the reintegration plan were considered successful because they quickly provided for basic needs, improved infrastructure, and provided employment opportunities. The long-term phase was beset by delays and administration problems. Long-term reintegration relied on land reform but the process was slowed by negotiations, limited donor response, and the government’s lack of political will.

² Spencer, D. Demobilization and Reintegration in Central America. Bonn International Center for Conversion. February 1997. P 52

³ USAID Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 1997 El Salvador.

⁴ Women Waging Peace. *El Salvador DDR, Adding Value: Women’s Contributions to Reintegration and Reconstruction in El Salvador*. Washington, DC, January 2004

Haiti

On September 19, 1994, approximately 20,000 U.S. troops participated in a military intervention in Haiti as part of the Multinational Force of Operation Uphold Democracy to restore power to the democratically elected Aristide government. Pre-intervention

Lessons-Learned --the Haiti experience demonstrates that:

Successful DDR is not possible in the absence of concurrent progress in the security, political, and economic sectors.

planning highlighted the threat posed by the Haitian military, the FAd'H, and the need to assuage the threat through demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of a significant portion of the FAd'H. An agreement with the Haitian military provided for safe departure of senior FAd'H commanders, leaving some 7,000 troops to be incorporated into the new civilian security forces or otherwise reintegrated into society. Multinational Force soldiers performed the tasks of disarming, demobilizing, and screening ex-Fad'H for

incorporation into the new police force and palace guard. Approximately 700 were selected for these civilian security forces; of the remaining 6,250, some 5,500 were registered for the USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) implemented reintegration program.

USAID/OTI signed an agreement with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to implement the ex-FAd'H reintegration program. On a programmatic level, the reintegration effort provided training, stipends, and employment services to 4,867 of the 5,500 registered ex-FAd'H (the remainder either turned down training or dropped out). Although only 304 found formal employment, the vast majority left the program well equipped to benefit from promised economic reforms. However, bad economic policies, widespread corruption, and lack of reversal of the high unemployment levels combined with the withdrawal of donor funds seriously undermined reintegration efforts. Different sectors of the ex-FAd'H and supporters, exploiting the situation, reorganized themselves in disparate political and military forces, and a renewed threat to security, fully ten years after they were disbanded.

Sierra Leone

The initial DDR program in Sierra Leone was designed following the election of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah as President and the subsequent Abidjan Accord in November 1996. The agreement was between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The following May, an Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)-led coup took place. The RUF then joined AFRC in the new government. Later that year, the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forced the rebels out of the capital, Freetown, and reinstated the Kabbah government - only to have the rebels retake the city in January of 1999. In May of 1999 the second round of peace talks began, resulting in the Lome Peace Agreement of July 1999.

To avoid losing the already allocated World Bank funds, the facilitators in Lome sought to keep the DDR program intact. DDR was restarted but progressed slowly. A number

Lessons-Learned – the Sierra Leone experience demonstrates the importance of:

- *An in-depth assessment of possible DDR clients (numbers, characteristics) and ammunitions to ensure long-term planning and adequate funding to cover the entirety of a DDR program.*
- *USG diplomatic engagement at the strategic level, which can provide incentives and pressure on governments and fighting factions to keep to DDR agreements even when the USG cannot supply direct funds.*
- *Guarding against inadvertently triggering resentments cross-community by incentive programs which gave cash to ex-combatants. This was interpreted as inequitable and a “reward” for perpetrators of violence, especially by local communities which did not receive projects.*

of UN peacekeepers were taken hostage in May of 2000 and a number of demobilized ex-combatants left their camps. Following the release of the hostages and the provision of a more robust UN force, the program resumed. This time it succeeded.

The DDR Program for Sierra Leone sought to disarm a number of groups: the Sierra Leone Army, the Komajors (a pro-government militia), the RUF, and the AFRC and its

supporters (former Sierra Leonian Army personnel and outsiders). The government of Sierra Leone, in conjunction with international partners such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group and the United Nations, conducted the disarmament and demobilization programs from 1998-2000, with reintegration programs running through 2003. The design of the DDR program included payments for the weapons turned in, allowances, and some training. At program inception it was estimated that DDR would be needed for 45,000 combatants; by the end of the program over 72,000 combatants had been demobilized. This was a clear demonstration that numeric estimates of combatants are often inaccurate, mainly because of difficulties defining who is a combatant.

The World Bank and the UN primarily ran the program. USG direct funding was limited because of our inability to co-mingle funds at the World Bank and because of the legal constraint against giving food or other assistance until after the combatants had been fully disarmed and demobilized. However, USG involvement was significant at the strategic level. The American Ambassador and British High Commissioner were asked to sit on the DDR advisory board that met regularly, normally under the chairmanship of the President. The success of the DDR program was in part due to this high-level diplomatic support amongst donor nations, including the USG.

Tajikistan

The demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent political uncertainty in Tajikistan resulted in a bloody and economically disastrous civil war that began in 1992 and ended in a United Nations brokered peace agreement in 1997. Tajikistan, the poorest of the Soviet Republics, became a prime candidate for a successful DDR program.

The 1997 Peace Accords resulted from a concerted national reconciliation effort in which the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) played a major role

Lessons-Learned – the Tajikistan experience demonstrates the importance of:

- *Equipping DDR bodies (in this case the CNR) with the proper capacity and support to plan, implement and monitor DDR.*
- *Identifying funding at the outset for the entirety of a DDR program.*

while other UN agencies and diverse international organizations, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) played an important supporting role. The Peace Accords included several measures that should be considered in any DDR program, decision, and

agreement. These include: provisions for power-sharing between the government and the opposition; in this case, a consultative body known as the Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR) which, although it has no direct power, is to be consulted by the Government. The agreement also codified the role of peacekeeping forces, the UN military observers, and the OSCE mission.

The process has not resulted in a free and democratic Tajikistan and much room for progress remains. The reintegration of the opposition military forces was not trouble free. The peace accords left to the CNR the difficult and lengthy job of working out the details of the DDR and its phased relationship to the political process. Limited international financial support for implementation of the peace accords forced representatives on the ground to prioritize, resulting in support primarily for reconstruction and ex-fighter employment programs.

U.S. involvement in the Tajik national reconciliation process was critical in that the United States firmly supported the UN and OSCE efforts, implemented USAID projects to assist the economic recovery process, and provided indirect assistance via generous U.S. support to international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

4. APPENDIX

4.1 DEFINITION OF TERMS

DDR: A program of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) to reduce the size of or eliminate belligerent armed forces by facilitating the transition of ex-combatants from military or insurgent units to sustainable civilian livelihoods.

Demobilization: The act of changing from a state of war to a state of peace, including disbanding or discharging troops. To release someone from service in an armed force, e.g., after a war. Demobilization entails either disbanding an armed unit, reducing the number of combatants or an interim stage before reassembling new armed forces.

Disarmament: The act of depriving belligerent forces of the means to wage war through the collection and control of weapons and weapon systems.

Reinsertion – Short to Medium-Term Reintegration: The short to medium period of time that refers to an ex-combatant's re-entry into civilian life. This period is often marked with a package of benefits to assist in the transition from military to civilian life. The goal of short-term reintegration assistance (often called "reinsertion") is to keep ex-combatants off the streets and to break command and control structures between the rank and file and commanders.

Reintegration – Long-Term: A longer-term perspective on an ex-combatant's re-entry into civilian life. The goal of long-term reintegration is sustainable livelihoods that help promote peaceful and secure communities. Long-term reintegration helps ex-combatants become socially and economically embedded in their communities.

Security Sector Reform (SSR): Reform or restructuring measures designed to enable a state to fully meet its obligations to provide its citizens a safe and secure environment, free from internal and external threats, through civilian control of security institutions responsible for protecting the state and its citizens and adherence to democratic rule of law.

Transitional Safety Net Allowance (TSA): A package of benefits or cash installments based on a market basket of goods distributed to ex-combatants following demobilization.

4.2 TYPICAL GROUPS INVOLVED IN DDR

Child Combatants: Child combatants are often part of demobilizing populations. They are usually put in the care of UNICEF or another organization for counseling, family tracing and family reunification.

Civil Society: When undertaking a community-based approach to reintegration, entire communities can participate in a DDR program.

Dissident Leaders or Warlords: These leaders or warlords can be forces for peace or violence and instability, or both. They may have private armies to protect themselves or use private funds for development purposes. Low-ranking fighters often cannot disarm and demobilize without permission from warlords or provincial leaders.

Family Members: Families sometimes accompany combatants and set up camps around demobilization centers. They must be considered when calculating costs of TSAs and transportation back to home villages or third sites.

Rank and File Combatants: The rank and file (low ranking fighters) includes adult (men and women) and child combatants. Typically, the decision to demobilize is made by higher-level commanders.

Senior to Mid-Level Commanders: Commanders may be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into a newly armed force, be held for prosecution, or receive political appointments. The issue of amnesty often figures prominently with this population.

Sub-Commanders: Lower-level commanders who do not have the position or standing of senior to mid-level commanders, but often have the intellect, resources or family/tribal status to require more sophisticated reintegration packages.

Women: Rebel groups often kidnap women and children to serve as fighters, sexual slaves, cooks, and baggage carriers. There are special challenges for women who are often victims of rape. They may have borne children from rape and are not accepted back into their families. Women require physical, psychological and income-generating assistance. DDR programs must be careful not to displace women who have worked in the economy during wartime.

4.3 USG AGENCY INVOLVEMENT IN DDR

This chart identifies offices within the Department of State and USAID that have a policy or programmatic interest in DDR programs. In some cases, offices may administer funds that could be used to support DDR programs. Due to legal restrictions on some funding

sources, it is important to identify programs for soldiers (i.e. the disarmament process) and programs for ex-combatants (i.e. reintegration process) as the available funding sources for such programs differ. For instance, USAID funds are appropriated for economic rather than military purposes. The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (section 660) generally prohibits assistance for law enforcement entities, but there are a number of exceptions, particularly for post-conflict situations. In addition, NADR Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA/LW) destruction funds can be used for the destruction of weapons collected through DDR programs and can be provided to law enforcement or other security sector entities for projects to properly store and manage weapons kept for national defense purposes. Legal advice must be obtained before obligating USG funds for DDR programs.

The chart below is illustrative and not comprehensive.

Responsible Agency/Bureau	Potential Support for DDR Programs	Funding Mechanism	Time to Obligate	Earmarks/Prohibitions/Waivers
USAID				
Regional Bureaus	Reintegration	Development Assistance (DA)	2 years	Heavily earmarked for specific sectors; has its own transfer mechanism (§109); requires concomitant investment by host country (§110)
DCHA/OTI	Reintegration	Transition Initiatives (TI)	Indefinite	Has notwithstanding authority; requires Congressional notification before new programs started or if program exceeds \$15M.
DCHA/OFDA	Reintegration - livelihoods activities/skills development	International Disaster and Famine Account (IDFA)	Indefinite	Has notwithstanding authority
DCHA/FFP	Reintegration - rehabilitation and resettlement	Food for Peace (PL-480 Title II)	Indefinite	Notwithstanding authority on emergency provision of agricultural commodities; restrictions on distributors and types of non-emergency assistance
DCHA/CMM	Reintegration - resettlement; civic, social, and economic programs; skills development	Development Assistance (DA)	2 years	Heavily earmarked for specific sectors; has its own transfer mechanism (§109); requires concomitant investment by host country (§110)

Responsible Agency/Bureau	Potential Support for DDR Programs	Funding Mechanism	Time to Obligate	Earmarks/Prohibitions/Waivers
DEPARTMENT OF STATE				
Regional Bureaus	Reintegration	Economic Support Funds (ESF)	2 years	Significant country-specific earmarks; cannot be used for military purposes
PM/WRA	Disarmament	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining & Related Programs (NADR)	1 year	Has notwithstanding authority.
PM/PPA	Disarmament, Demobilization and Security Sector Reform as related to peacekeeping operations	Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)	1 year	Country restrictions may apply; congressional notification required. Generally cannot be used for law enforcement/ police activities.
INL	Narcotics control and law enforcement policies and programs	Intl. Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	2 years	Cap on administrative expenses; broad restriction on funding for major drug producing/transit countries (\$490)
IO	U.S. contributions to Peacekeeping Missions	Contributions for Intl. Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA)*		
DRL	All DRL security issues; DDR in Iraq	Economic Support Funds (ESF, through Human Rights & Democracy Fund)	2 years	Similar to those for regional bureau ESF
PRM	Reintegration of refugees	Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	Indefinite	Has notwithstanding clause pertaining specifically to assistance to foreign countries; has both caps and minimum contributions to certain beneficiaries
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR				
ILAB	Rehabilitation and prevention services in the form of educational and training alternatives and counseling for former child soldiers	Departments of Labor, HHS Appropriation	1 year	Funding has generally included earmarked funds for the International Labor Organization to support efforts to eliminate exploitive child labor, as well as other non-earmarked funds to promote educational alternatives to exploitive child labor.

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